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Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities", or ''PAP'', which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. ==The ''Principle of Alternative Possibilities''== The principle of alternative possibilities (acronym ''PAP'') forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, often called the ''core argument'' for incompatibilism.〔〔〔 This argument is detailed below: (1) PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.〔 (2) An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false. (3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false. Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of free will and determinism, like Alfred Ayer, Walter Terence Stace and Daniel C. Dennett) reject premise two, arguing that, properly understood, free will is not incompatible with determinism. According to the traditional compatibilist analysis of free will, an agent is free to do otherwise when he would have done otherwise had he wanted to do otherwise.〔 Agents may possess free will, according to the conditional analysis, even if determinism is true. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Frankfurt cases」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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